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THE ECONOMY OF OKINAWA: 
PERFORMANCE, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
Lino Briguglio 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Japanese prefecture of0kinawa1 lies between the 
Japanese mainland and Southeast Asia (see Figure 1) 
and is made up of 160 islands' of which 50 are inhab-
ited, with Okinawa main island being by far the larg-
est one. The islands can be divided into three major 
groups, namely (a) the Okinawa Island Group' b) the 
Miyako Island Group and (c) the Yaeyama Island 
Group. They lie scattered across a vast sea area of 
1000 kilometres in the East-West direction and 400 
kilometres in theN orth-South direction. The total land 
area of the prefecture is 2264 square kilometres, of 
which around 80% is taken by four islands (see map 
below), namely Okinawa Island (1193 square kilome-
tres), Iriomote Island (284 square kilometres), Ishigaki 
Island (221 square kilometres) and Miyako Island (159 
square kilometres). 
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Location of Okinawa 
In 1993, the population of the prefecture amounted to 
around 1.24 million, of which 90% lived on the 
Okinawa island. The population density was around 
540 persons per square kilometre. 
The culture of Okinawa has distinct characteristics 
which make it markedly different from that of main-
land Japan. However, the language used by the 
Okinawans is Japanese and the islands are adminis-
tered as one of the 4 7 prefectures of Japan. 
This paper will focus on the economic aspects of the 
prefecture and is divided into six sections. Following 
this introduction, the paper gives a brief account of 
recent Okinawan history which provides information 
regarding the most important developments which led 
to the formation of the present structure of the 
economy. The third section describes the most impor-
tant economic changes in Okinawa since 1972, the year 
when the prefecture was returned to Japan after a 
spell of American administration. Section four de-
scribes the present structure of the Okinawan 
economy, and compares some Okinawan economic ag-
gregates with those mainland Japan. The fifth sec-
tion discusses the problems and prospects of the 
Okinawan economy. The last section presents some 
concluding remarks. 
2. BRIEF RECENT HISTORY OF OKINAWA 
The Ryukyu Islands, broadly corresponding to the area 
now called the Okinawa Prefecture, became a Japa-
nese administrative area in 1872 and were organised 
as a Japanese prefecture in 1879.3 Until the thirties, 
the prefecture depended primarily on agriculture, and, 
just before World War II, this sector produced 50% of 
output and employed 70% of the labour force. The most 
important crop was sugar cane, sweet potatoes, rice 
and soy beans in order of importance. 
During World War II, Okinawa prefecture played an 
important role in the strategies of Japan and the U.S., 
principally because the islands were considered by 
East China 
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both the U.S. and Japan as a final line of defence 
against a U.S. landing on the Japanese mainland. For 
this reason, a major battle was waged by the two pow-
ers for the control of Okinawa in March-June 1945, 
from which the Americans emerged victorious. Dur-
ing the battle, over94 thousand Japanese and 12 thou-
sand American soldiers were killed. About 125 thou-
sand civilians were also killed, since Okinawan civil-
ians had to cooperate with the Japanese military. It is 
indeed very ironical that a people with a reputation of 
being peace loving had to experience in their midst 
one of the bloodiest battles of World War II. 
Following the outcome of the Battle of Okinawa, the 
transfers from the central government. 
A large proportion of the land area of Okinawa is still 
however utilised as U.S. military bases, a situation 
which is legalised under the Japan-U.S. mutual de-
fence treaty, signed in 1951.4 In 1972 around 290 
square kilometres were assigned to the U.S. military 
- now reduced to 250 square kilometres. At present 
there are plans for utilising the military basis for eco-
nomic and social use (see Okinawa Prefectural Gov-
ernment, 1993, p. 4) including the construction of a 
free trade zone and residential urban developments, 
if and when the land is returned to Japan.' 
U:S. formed the United Asweshallshow,atpresent 
States Civil Administration ,---------------------, Okinawa is still trapped in 
of the Ryukyu Islands a dependency relation with 
(USCAR) which in reality mainland Japan, since it 
was a military government. receives large amounts of 
This administrative setup financial transfers from the 
lasted until1972. During the Central Government, and 
1945-1972 period, the island its external trade is to a 
of Okinawa became a U.S. very large extent carried out 
military stronghold, and with Japan.' 
played an important role in 
the U.S. strategies to contain 
communism in the cold war 
era. In the Vietnam war, the 
island was a major base from 
which aircraft, troops and 
supplies were dispatched. 
• 
The reconstructed Shuri Castle. The Castle was used by 
the Ryukyu kings for administrative and ceremonial pur-
poses. It is now a symbol of the rich historical and cul-
tural heritage of Okinawa 
Today, out of the 4 7 prefec-
tures of Japan, Okinawa 
has the lowest per capita 
income and is one of the 
most dependent on Central 
Government transfers. 
3. PERFORMANCE OF THE ECONOMY 
During the USCAR administration, the economy of 
the island was transformed into one depending on the 
American military expenditure. At the height of the 
American occupation, the U.S. military bases em-
ployed around 40,000 Okinawans and contributed al-
most 50% of Okinawan total income. In 1970, around 
57% of export proceeds originated from this source. At 
that time, the per capita income in Okinawa was about 
67% of the average for all Japan. Social overhead capi-
\ ~ tal (roads, water supply, sewerage system, housing, 
• j education, medical care and welfare facilities) re-
mained, in general, of a much lower level than the 
Japanese average. 
Following the reversion of Okinawa in 1972, three Ten 
Year Development Plans were launched. This section 
will assess the performance of the Okinawan economy 
against the targets set by these plans, the most im-
portant purpose of which was to promote the develop-
ment of Okinawa in order to bring it in line with that 
of mainland. 
3.1 The First Ten Year Plan 
The reversion of Okinawa to Japan was agreed upon 
in 1969 and occurred in May 1972. Following this his-
toric development, the economy of Okinawa reduced 
drastically its dependency on the U.S. military ex-
penditure. In 1971, just before the Reversion Year, a 
law entitled (loosely translated) Special Measures for 
the Development of Okinawa was enacted with the 
purpose of stabilising the livelihood and improve the 
welfare of the people of Okinawa and to promote the 
development of the prefecture. This piece of legisla-
tion ushered in a series often year development plans, 
and these have led to large financial flows from the 
National Treasury, giving rise to a situation where the 
prefecture has become increasingly dependent on 
The first ten year plan covered the period 1972 to 1982. 
The plan gave top priority to the narrowing of per 
capita income and the expansion of the manufactur-
ing sector. During the ten year period covered by the 
plan, the Okinawan economy grew at a very satisfac-
tory rate, with the increase in Gross Domestic Prefec-
tural Product averaging about 9% per annum at con-
stant prices (see Figure 1), a growth rate higher than 
that of the Japanese economy as a whole. 
Employment also increased during the first develop-
ment plan period. In 1972 there were 364 thousand 
employees, increasing to 446 thousand in 1982, an 
increase of about 2.4% per annum. The rate of unem-
ployment at first rose from 3% in 1972 to just under 
. •
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The Growth Pattern of the Okinawan GDP and employment. 
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The outcomes of the second development plan 
were also a mixture of successes and failures. 
Between 1982 and 1992 the average rate of 
growth of GDP was 4.4% per annum in real 
terms, which is about the same as that for 
Japan as a whole, and in this respect, the plan 
targets can be said to have been attained. 
72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 
Employment increased from 446 thousand in 
1972 to 539 in 1992, an increase of about 2.3% 
per annum, which was a faster rate of increase 
than for Japan as a whole . 
Year 
L--------'=·=·-=c:"":':":' P:n:.c:''=:-o:-:C:o:":":"":':P:ri:c':'~l ____ j The objective of expanding the tourist sector has likewise been achieved in the sense that 
7% in 1977, but then feU again to 5% in 1982 (see Fig-
ure 2). 
During the first plan period, the gap between the av-
erage per capita income for Japan and that of Okinawa 
decreased from 40% in 1972 to 26% in 1982, which 
can be considered as a measure of success of the plan. 
The first plan consisted of a number of projects, which 
supported rapid improvements in the infrastructure 
of the economy, roads and housing. The budget aJJoca-
tion for the Okinawa Promotion and Development 
amounted to ¥37 billion in 1972 and increased to just 
over ¥200 billion in 1981, a total of¥1250 billion in 
ten years (about Y1 billion per capita). Of this 43% 
went for road building, 19% for sanitation and sewer-
age, 18'iC for airports, 16% for farmlands and forestry 
and 5% for housing. 
A major failure of the first ten year plan was that the 
manufacturing sector did not expand its share as pro-
jected. In 1972 the share of the secondary sector ac-
counted for 28% of total output (with manufacturing 
taking 11% and construction 16%). In 1982, the share 
of the secondary sector decreased to 22% (with manu-
facturing taking 7% and construction taking 
the number of incoming tourists increased from 1. 9 
million in 1982 to 3.2 million in 1992, whereas income 
from tourism increased from ¥201 billion to ¥344 bil-
lion yen, an increase of about 70% in ten years. There 
are however a number of misgivings about tourism 
development in Okinawa -these wiJI be discussed at 
a later stage in this paper. 
As in the previous ten years there was a marked de-
velopment in public facilities as a result of the second 
plan (see Okinawa Prefecture, 1993, pp. 18-21), in-
volving improvements in paved roads, airport and 
harbour development, education and medical facili-
ties, restoration of cultural property and welfare serv-
ices. 
The most important failure of the plan was related to 
the opening gap in per capita income with the aver-
age for Japan. The gap tended to decrease from 26.2% 
in 1972 to 24.2% in 1986, but it increased again after 
that year, reaching 28.5% in 1991, a higher gap than 
that prevailing in 1982. 
Another failure was that the structure of the economy 
did not change in the desired direction. The share of 
14%) of total Gross Output. On the other hand, r----------------------'""'1 
the share of the tertiary sector increased from 
67% in 1972 to 75% in 1982. In this respect, 
the targets of the first development plan have 
not been met. 
3.2 The Second Ten Year Plan 
7 
Figure 2. 
Employment and Unemployment in Okinawa 
Ye~ 
The second plan covered the period 1982 to 
1992. There was a change of emphasis in this 
plan in that the target of self-reliance was as-
signed more importance than the first pl!in. 
Another important characteristic of the second 
plan was that tourism was assigned a major 
:role, foJiowing the awareness that tourist ex- I·•· Emp. (OOOOOJ ·o· unemp. <%l 
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the secondary sector continued to decrease, from 22.0% 
in 1982 to 21.5% in 1990, with the manufacturing sec-
tor further losing its share from 7.3% to 6.6'ir. On the 
other hand, the tertiary sector continued to expand, 
from 75.2% in 1982 to 78.1% in 1992. 
Self-Reliance. The success or otherwise of attaining 
the self-reliance objective of the second plan is not easy 
to assess, because there are various indicators of self-
reliance and dependency. Here we take four ratios, 
which, it is admitted, by themselves do not shed 
enough light on the issue of dependency. 
The first ratio relates to the Resource Gap. The ratio 
of total exports to total imports has increased from 
58% in 1982 to 64% in 1991 (See Figure 4). Kakazu 
(1991) has refined this index by excluding receipts/ 
payments from sales/purchases associated v.ith the 
military bases. Using this ratio, we find that the ratio 
has tended to increase during the second plan. These 
ratios would seem to suggest that Okinawa has re-
duced its resource gap in relative terms, and thereby 
became more self-reliant. It should be noted, however, 
that these ratios may not very meaningful, because 
external trade in Okinawa is to a very large extent 
directed to and from the Japanese mainland, to which 
the prefecture is dependent economically and politi-
cally. 
The second ratio relates to the dependence on trans-
fers from outside the prefecture. If we measure the 
ratio of Central Government transfers to total exter-
nal receipts we will find that these transfers have ac-
tually tended to increase from 52% to 55% between 
1982 and 1988 (Okinawa Prefecture, 1994) but de-
creased to 50% by 1991. 
A related ratio is the rate of domestic fiscal resources, 
defined as domestically raised finances as a percent-
age of total government revenue. This has increased 
:-\ from 60% in 1982 to around 67% in 1991. 
') 
·- The fourth ratio relates to income from the military 
basis. This has tended to decrease its percentage share 
of external inflows, from 10% in 1982 to 8% in 1991. 
When expressed as a ratio to resident total produc-
tion, income from the military basis has decreased 
from 7.5% in 1982 to just under 5% in 1991. 
From these statistics there is some evidence that dur-
ing the second ten year plan period, the Okinawan 
economy has become more self-reliant. But this con-
clusion should be interpreted with great caution. De-
pendence on the Central Government finances is still 
very high, about two times as large as the average for 
other prefectures, indicating that Okinawa is still very 
heavily reliant on transfers from outside the prefec-
ture. It should be recalled that transfers from the Cen-
tral Government not only gave rise to infrastructural 
development, but also generated substantial income 
and employment in the prefecture (see Table 13-11 of 
Japan Statistical Yearbook 1993/94). 
Moreover, the structure of the Okinawan economy, has 
become more service oriented, which as may be one 
explanation for relatively low per capita income, given 
that services employment tends to be in small estab-
lishments and generally carries with it lower wage 
rates compared to other forms of employment (see 
Table 3-28 of Japan Statistical Yearbook 1993/94). 
It may be concluded therefore that although there were 
signs of increased self-reliance in the Okinawan 
economy between 1982 and 1992, the economy is still 
very much dependent on the Japanese mainland, and 
its structure has become less manufacturing oriented. 
3.3 Third Development Plan 
The third plan covers the period 1992- 2002. The pur-
pose of the plan has broadly the same objectives as 
the previous two, namely to reduce the differences that 
still exist between Okinawa and mainland Japan, to 
infrastructural development to strengthen the 
Okinawan economy, and to make the economy more 
self-reliant. The plan also emphasised the promotion 
of culture, improved welfare and promotion of inter-
national communication, and assigned an import place 
to tourism resort development. 
It is too early yet to comment on the successes or fail-
ures of the third year plan, but there appears to be 
some misgivings among economic analysts in Okinawa 
regarding the important place assigned to resort de-
velopment on the island. 
3.4 The Overall Results of the Plans 
As stated, there was a rapid increase in per capita 
income during the twenty year period covering the two 
development plans, which however was not enough to 
close the gap with the average for Japan. This gap 
renders Okinawa as the prefecture with the lowest 
per capita income in Japan. Of interest, however, is 
that the per capita income of Okinawa is higher than 
that of most developed countries, although most prob-
ably the purchasing power of this income is not as high 
as the absolute per capita income suggests, due to the 
high prices of commodities in the prefecture. 7 
During the twenty-year period there was an expan-
sion of social overhead capital, eliminating the gap 
and at times reaching higher levels compared to the 
national average, in a number of areas including paved 
roads, households with tap water, sewerage per per-
son and homes for the elderly. Okinawa however still 
lags the national average in hospitals, schools and 
parks (see Higa, 1993). It should be recalled that the 
\) 
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Table 1. improvements in social overhead 
capital were mostly fmanced through 
transfers from the National Govern-
ment. 
The Structure of the Okinawan Economy 
OKINAWA JAPAN 
1972 1982 1991 1991 The plans contained some important 
targets, including the expansion of 
the manufacturing sector to render 
its share comparable with that of 
mainland Japan. As stated, the tar-
get was not met, and this sector pres-
ently contributes only around 6.5% of 
Gross Prefectural Domestic Product. 
PRIMARY SECTOR(%) 7.3 5.0 2.8 2.3 
SECONDARY SECTOR(%) 27.9 21.7 21.0 39.2 
of which: 
Construction (%) 16.4 14.4 14.2 9.9 
Manufacturing (%) 10.9 7.3 6.5 29.0 
TERTIARY SECTOR(%) 67.3 . 75.2 79.0 63.7 
Adjustment* -2.5 -1.9 -2.8 -5.2 
Total(%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total Y billion 507.4 1822.6 3161.0 458599 
Some factors which may have contrib-
uted to this lack of success include 
(a) the high cost of electrical power 
(b) problems of water supply arising 
not from lack of rainfall but mostly 
from leakages and distribution (c) 
* The adjustment refers import taxes and interest deductions. 
absence of a railway system and other inadequacies 
in internal public transport (c) fear of labour union 
strength on the part of investors (d) high transport 
costs due to distance and insularity of the prefecture 
and (e) the inability of Okinawa to apply protection 
against imports from mainland Japan.' 
On the other hand, the services sector grew faster than 
expected. Some reasons that could be put forward to 
explain this phenomenon include that (a) Okinawans 
are more adapt at working in the services sector, which 
requires less investment and training and (b) the in-
crease in employment and income in Okinawa brought 
about an increase in consumer demand, giving rise to 
an increase in derived labour demand in the distribu-
tive trades. 
4. THE PRESENT STRUCTURE 
OF THE OKINAWAN ECONOMY 
80 
and its measurement avoids double counting of sales 
from one firm (or sector) to another. 
Table 1 shows the sectoral shares of the Okinawan 
Gross Prefectural Domestic Product for 1972, 1982 and 
1991, and compares the composition ofGPDPwith the 
GDP of Japan as a whole. The table shows that in 
1991, the primary sector contributed just over 3% to 
the GPDP, the secondary sector contributed 21% and 
the tertiary sector contributed 79%. Figure 3 gives a 
pictorial comparison of the Japanese and the 
Okinawan structure of the economy. 
The Okinawan economy is therefore dominated by the 
tertiary sector, while the secondary sector contributes 
Figure 3. 
The Composition of the Okinawan GDP 
. -~ 
, j This section describes the structure of the 70 
Okinawan economy and compares it with that 
of Japan. Four main aggregates will be ex-
amined, namely the Gross Prefectural Domes· 
tic Output, Gross Prefectural Gross Expendi-
ture, the Balance of Payments and the La-
bour Force. 
4.1 The Gross Prefectural 
Domestic Product 
The Gross Prefectural Domestic Product is an 
aggregate of the value added produced within 
the prefecture. In other words, it measures 
the net contribution of each firm, after deduct-
ing intermediate inputs, such as raw mate-
60 
50 
% 40 
30 
20 
10 
rial and other purchases from outside the firm Primary Sector Manufacturing Construction Tertiary Sector 
(or outside the sector). The GPDP therefore I I 
• Okinawa D Japan 
excludes imports from outside the prefecture L-------~· ==========~·-____ _) 
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a relatively small proportion to GPDP. Table 2. 
Gross Expenditure in Okinawa 
OKINAWA JAPAN 
Category 1972 1982 1991 1991 
4.1.1 The Primary Sector. This sec-
tor, which consists of agriculture, 
forestries and fishing, has tended to 
reduce its share ofGPDP between 1972 
and 1991. Agriculture dominates the 
primary sector, and in 1991 this sub-
sector produced ¥624.3 billion (2.2% of 
GPDP), with the most important prod-
ucts being sugar cane (about a fifth of 
total agricultural output), vegetables, 
pork, flowers, cattle, leaf tobacco and 
pineapples, in that order. 
PRIVATE EXPENDITURE (%) 98.2 83.5 75.3 81.4 
of which: 
Consumption(%) 63.3 61.4 55.6 56.3 
Investment(%) 34.9 22.1 19.7 25.1 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE(%) 27.0 36.5 31.6 15.8 
of which: 
Consumption(%) 17.7 18.3 16.9 9.0 
Investment ('it) 9.3 16.3 12.8 6.7 
The fisheries sub-sector is very small, 
and contributed ¥191.9 billion in 1991 
(about 0.6% of GPDPJ in 1991, with 
coastal fishing taking the largest share 
of the total. 
FOREIGN SECTOR ('lc) ·19.0 -23.9 -9.9 2.7 
of which: 
Exports Goods & Services(%) 39.7 31.6 23.9 14.5 
Imports Goods & Services(%) 58.7 54.3 33.2 11.8 
NON-PREFECT. INCO:\fE* -6.2 3.9 3.0 -
G. P. E.(%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
4.1.2 The Secondary Sector. This sec-
tor comprises mainly construction and 
. manufacturing. 
G.P.E. (Billion Yen) 480.6 1822.6 3147.4 458599.0 
The construction sub-sector grew rap-
idly after the reversion, when vast amount of funds 
from the Japanese mainland were transferred to 
Okinawa for the construction of roads, harbours, air-
ports and residential building. As a result, the 
Okinawan secondary sector is dominated by construc-
tion. 
The manufacturing sub-sector produced ¥193.8 bil-
lion (6.5%) ofGPDP in 1991. It is dominated by small 
firms, with the average number of persons employed 
per establishment being less than 10 (see Japan Sta-
tistical Yearbook, 199314, Table 5.6). The most impor-
tant products are foodstuffs and beverages, petroleum 
and coal products, non-metallic minerals (ceramics, 
>)cement clay and quarrying), metal products and pub-
.\ . lishing/printing. 
0 kinawa also produces a number of traditional crafts, 
such as woven and died cloth, lacquer-ware, processed 
coral and decorative glass. In 1991, the gross value of 
the traditional craft products amounted to around ¥8.0 
million yen. 
Table 3 confirms that the share of the manufacturing 
sub-sector has tended to decrease since 1972. As al-
ready indicated, this is one of the most worrying as-
pects of the Okinawan economy.' 
4.1.3 The Tertiary Sector. The tertiary sector, which 
as can be seen from Table 1 is by far the largest main 
sector in the Okinawan economy, contributed 79% of 
the GPDP in 1991. This sector comprises personal 
services to household and to the government" (39.3%) 
wholesale and retail trades (14.6%), real estate 
* Non-prefectural income includes statistical error. 
(10.3%), transport and communication services (8%), 
banking and financial services (3.6%) and electricity 
gas and water (3.2%). The figures in brackets show 
the individual.sub-sectors' contribution to GPDP in 
1991. The biggest sub-sectors, namely personal serv-
ices and retail and whole trades consist mainly of small 
firms. 
4.2 The Structure of Prefectural Expenditure 
Table 2 shows the expenditure patterns of Okinawa 
Prefecture for the years 1972, 1982 and 1992, and com· 
pares the 1992 composition with that of Japan as a 
whole. 
4.2.1 The Public Sector. The share of public sector 
spending has tended to increase from 27% ofG.P.D.E. 
(17% of total final expenditure) to 37% ofG.D.P.E (24% 
of total final expenditure) 1982. It decreased to 32% 
of G.D.P.E (24% of total final expenditure) in 1991. 
The share of public expenditure in Okinawa is higher 
than the average for the Japanese economy. One rea-
son for this is the relatively large outlay of public funds 
for infrastructural development, which also require 
large administration expenses. 
4.2.2 Imports and Imports. An important charac-
teristic ofthe Okinawan economy is that exports and 
imports are much higher than those for Japan as a 
whole. This is typical· of small economies, who of ne-
cessity, require a larger market than their own to pro-
duce certain products efficiently and who tend to have 
very few natural resources. 
.. ~ 
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Table 2 also shows that the 
Table 3. Okinawan external trade gap 
(comprising goods and services) The Okinawan Balance of Payments 
has tended to decrease between 
1991 1972 and 1991. Most Okinawan 1975 1982 
imports and exports originate Credit Debit Credit Debit Credit Debit 
from and are directed to the 
Japanese mainland. However, Merchandise trade 217 685 247 951 271 982 
Okinawa also trade with other Services trade 204 36 330 40 481 65 
countries, and in the case of mer- Factor income 63 89 174 
chandise, around 23% of imports Non Govt. Transfers 1 15 8 25 29 38 
and 33% of exports are trans- Govt. Transfers 230 774 68 169 700 305 
acted with non-Japanese suppli- Current A/C Flows 715 812 1141 11851 655 1390 
ers and clients. .Govt. Capital flows 125 1 273 3 270 9 
Private Capital flows 24 14 4 
4.3 The Balance of Capital A/C Flows 149 1 287 3 274 9 
Payments 
Total inflows/outflows 864 813 1429 1188 1929 1399 
Table 3 gives a brief description L----------------------------..-1 
of the Okinawan balance of payments, from whlch a 
few characteristics of the Okinawan economy can be 
deduced . 
Firstly, during the period covered by the table, there 
has been a consistent deficit in the balance of mer-
chandise trade. The most important exports and im-
ports were oil related products. Although the gap has 
tended to grow in absolute terms, it decreased in per-
centage terms during the 1980s. 
Secondly, there has been a consistent surplus in serv-
ices trade, mostly arising from inflows from tourism. 
Expenditure by military personnel has also been of 
importance in this regard. This surplus has tended to 
grow in absolute terms during the period covered in 
the table, although it has decreased in percentage 
terms during the eighties. 
As a result of these changes, the resource gap, which 
is the difference between exports and imports 
ernment have also given rise to a net inflows of funds 
to the prefectural balance of payments. 
4.3.1 International Merchandise Trade. A brief 
look at the international trade of Okinawa is in order 
here. The exports and imports shown in Table 3 in-
clude those sold to and purchased from other Japa-
nese prefectures. In 1991 exports of goods to and from 
non-Japanese sources amounted to ¥86.6 billion, of 
which around 90% were directed at South East Asia, 
mostly South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore 
and the Philippines. Other important clients of 
Okinawa were China and Guam. Most of these exports 
were oil products.(around 80%), food, mostly from the 
sea (around 3%) and machinery/equipment (around 
4%). 
During the same year, imports from non-Japanese 
sources amounted to ¥234.8 billion, 73% of which was 
crude oil originating from Saudi Arabia, Oman, United 
:-~of goods and services, has increased from ¥300 
1
: • ./ billion in 1975 to ¥414 billion in 1982 and de-
creased to ¥295 billion in 1991. Figure 4 shows 
Figure4 
how the resource gap in the Okinawan bal-
ance of payments changed between 1975 and 
1991. The figure also shows that the ratio of 
imports to exports has tended to decrease dur-
ing the period under consideration. 
Thirdly, as Table 3 shows, inflows offactor in-
comes have been significant during the period 
covered by the table. These inflows mostly re-
sulted from the military bases, in the form of 
wages and rents. 
Fourthly inflows of funds associated with 
transfers were also important. These were 
mostly financial allocations by the Japanese 
Central Government to the prefectural govern-
ment. Capital inflows to the prefectural gov-
The Okinawan Resource Gap 
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Table4. 
Tourism Inflows 
1972 1982 1991 
The tourists that visit Okinawa come mainly 
from mainland Japan, and only a very small 
percentage originate from other countries. 
Okinawa is simply too expensive to attract in-
ternational tourism. 12 
Tourists (thousands) 443.7 1,189.2 3,151.9 
Income (billion yen) 32.5 200.0 
Tourism income as(%) - 17.5 
of Current A/C receipts 
Arab Emirates, and Iran. Other important imports are 
food products including meat products (around 16%). 
This confirms that the Okinawan foreign trade is 
mostly related to oil products, which the prefecture 
imports in crude form and exports in a refined form. 
The Okinawan foreign trade is therefore 
very undiversified and depends too much 
on one product, which of course carries with 
the risk ofhaving too many eggs in one bas-
ket. 
4.3.2 Tourism Inflows. In Okinawa tour-
ism has been given a primary role in the 
economic growth ofthe prefecture and con-
siderable capital outlays have been as-
signed for the infrastructure for resort tour-
ism. The building of large hotels and golf 
courses and the improvement of beaches 
have been feature prominently in the sec-
ond development plan, and even more so 
in the third development plan. 
345.2 
20.9 
The main factors accounting for the rapid in-
crease in tourism from Japan can be explained 
in terms of (1) the high per capita income in 
Japan allowing for an increasing demand in 
leisure activities (2) the big Japanese corpora-
tions have during the past twenty years tended to di-
versuy their business with an increasing emphasis in 
the supply of leisure related productions and (3) the 
Central Government has in recent years adopted a 
policy which encourages development of resort tour-
ism (1987 Resort Development Act). 
R 0 t D l t A d. t th l t Tourism is a very important industry in Okinawa. es r eve opmen . ccor mg o e a - '------------------------__J 
est Okinawa Prefectural Master Plan for 
Resort Land Development, 13% of t)le land area is 
designated for this purpose. As at 1991, there were 
16 resort hotels in operation, mostly owned and con-
trolled by non-Okinawan interests. When the plan is 
completed, Okinawa will have 41 resort hotels and 4 7 
golf courses (with a total land area of around 300 
square kilometres), mostly concentrated on Okinawa 
island, which already has a very high population den-
sity and therefore intense competition in land use. 
Income from Tourism. Since 1972, Okinawa has expe-
rienced a rapid increase in tourism related income, as 
seen in Table 4. In 1972 the number of tourists 
amounted to just under half a million, and this inflow 
has risen steadily, exceeding 3 million in 1992." In-
come from tourism amounted to ¥32.5 billion in 1972 
and increased to ¥345.2 billion in 1991, a ten times 
increase in nominal terms (or about four times in real 
times). This increase in the importance of tourism has 
also been reflected in balance of payments statistics, 
where currentA/C receipts from tourism as a percent-
age of total external sources tended to increase from 
1982 to 1992. 
Problems of Resort Tourism. Riga (1991) identifies a 
number of problems connected with the Okinawan 
tourist industry. These include (a) the resort hotels 
are mostly owned by non-Okinawan interest and capi-
tal (b) management is dominated by non-Okinawan 
personnel (c) food and raw material used in hotels, to 
a large extent is purchased from mainland Japan (d) 
the industry has limited multiplier effects because it 
is an enclave form of tourism (e) resort tourism devel-
opment has given rise to a increase in land value, 
which is detrimental to Okinawan business and to 
residents in general CD tourism has exacerbated the 
water problem and water shortages are common and 
(g) the facilities required for resort tourism pose a large 
financial burden on the finance of the local govern-
ment. 
Of interest is that resort related revenues to the gov-
ernment are rather high, and averaged around 12% 
of total government revenue in recent years, but only 
25% of this is actually retained by the local govern-
ment (Higa 1991). In this regard one should also con-
sider pubic expense connected indirectly with tourism, 
(~\ 
', _ __/ 
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Table 5. 
Military Expenditure (Billion Yen) 
1975 1982 1991 
Personnel Expenditure 39.5 69.4 53.2 
Wages from bases 36.1 30.6 47.9 
Land Lease 26.9 37.4 51.6 
Total Income (¥ billion) 102.5 137.4 152.7 
. 
Military Receipts as(%) 17.8 11.6 9.2 
of Cur. A/C receipts 
including water supply, the sewerage system and en-
vironment protection. 
Another factor to consider is that resort tourism may 
have some detrimental effect on local business. There 
is evidence to suggest that occupancy rates in small 
hotels, which tend to be locally owned have low occu-
pancy rates (Okinawa Prefecture, 1990). There is also 
Table 5 shows that there are three main inflows from 
this source, namely consumption expenditure by mili-
tary personnel, wages to employees engaged at the 
bases and land lease receipts for the bases. It can be 
seen that although the total amount of revenue in-
creased between 1975 and 1991, the dependence on 
this source of revenue (measured as a ratio of total 
external receipts on current account) has decreased. 
It is however still a relatively large proportion of ex-
ternal inflows, amounting to just over 9% in 1991. 
4.3.4 Government Related Inflows. Table 3 shows 
that the Okinawan Balance of Payments would have 
had consistent deficits on current and capital account 
had there not been transfers and capital flows from 
the Central Government. This problem has already 
been discussed elsewhere in this paper, and we shall 
not dwell further on it except tore-emphasise the fact 
that this is an indicator that the Okinawan economy 
is still heavily dependent on Central Government sup-
port. 
a possibility that advertising and =============================~ 
packaging is diverting tourists 
away from locally owned hotels 
(see Higa, 1991, Miki 1990 and 
Ukai 1990). 
4.3.3 Military Bases Expendi-
tures. When discussing the mili-
tary bases in Okinawa, the argu-
ment necessarily focuses on two 
aspects, namely land use and ex-
penditure. 
Land Use. Traditionally land use 
in Okinawa was mainly for agri-
cultural purposes. Following the 
World War II, a large proportion 
of Okinawa land area was taken A considerable proportion of Okinawan land is taken up by the U.S. military bases. 
for U.S. military purposes (See L... ___________________________ ...J 
Shimambikuro, 1992). Land in 
Okinawa is very scarce, and, as already stated, it will 
be scarcer still in the future with the growth of resort 4.4 The Labour Marke.t 
tourism. 
In recent years, the land used for military purposes 
amounted to 256 square kilometres, which is around 
11.5% of total land use and 20% of mainland Okinawa. 
The land assigned to the military is mostly in the cen-
tre of Okinawa, where an urbanisation process is un-
der way. In 1992 there were 45 facilities on mainland 
Okinawa, of which 20 were Marine bases, 10Air-force 
bases, 11 Naval bases and 4 Army basis (see People's 
Voices for Peace, 1993), with about 29,000 military per-
sonnel, 21,000 family members and 900 non-military 
American employees, giving a total of50,000 persons." 
Military Expenditure. As stated, military expenditure 
is a very important source of income for Okinawa. 
Table 6 shows the composition of employment in 
Okinawa for the years 1972, 1982 and 1991, and com-
pares the composition of employment with that of Ja-
pan as a whole. 
Table 6 shows that by and large the distribution of 
employment is similar to the sectoral distribution of 
GPDP. The distribution of employment, compared with 
that of Japan as a whole is also shown graphically in 
Figure 5. 
4.4.1 Unemployment. Okinawa has a relatively high 
rate of unemployment, which in 1991 amounted to 
4.0% of the labour force, compared to 2.1% for the na-
tional average. This rate of unemployment would seem 
. I 
\, _./ 
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to be rather low by European or U.S. stand- .-------------------------, 
ards, but it is one of the highest amongJapa- Figure 5· 
nese prefectures. It is to be noted here that 70 Structure of Employment 
in Japan, the unemployment rate may be un-
derstated when compared to the US and the 
EU, because Japanese firms do not tend to 
shed labour as readily as US and EU firms 
during a recession. 
The distribution of employment in Okinawa 
also differs markedly from that of Japan as 
h % a w ole, since it has a much lower percent-
age of persons employed in manufacturing 
and a higher percentage employed in con-
struction. Another characteristic is that in the 
tertiary sector of Okinawa employment is 
relatively larger than that of Japan as a 
whole. These characteristics are similar to 
those related to GPDP composition. 
4.4.2 Migration. An important characteris-
tic of the Okinawan labour market is migra-
tion. Inward migration consists mainly of 
returned migrants and immigration of man-
agers/administrators from the mainland. The 
60 
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latter group of immigrants generally accom- 1------------------------...1 
pany private investment and Central Govemment fi. 
nancial transfers. 14 
Outward migration occurs due to lack of job opportu-
nities in Okinawa. However, such migration is not as 
large as one would expect given the unemployment 
and income discrepancy between Okinawa and main-
landJapan. 
Between 1989 and 1991 around 84,000 persons emi-
grated from Okinawa to mainland Japan, an average 
of 28,000 annually (equivalent to around 2.3% of the 
population or 5% of the labour force). During the same 
Table 6. 
Structure of Employment 
OKINAWA 
Category 1972 1982 1991 
PRIMARY SECTOR(%) 18.1 13.2 10.4 
SECONDARY SECTOR(%) 20.9 20.2 20.2 
of which: 
Construction (%) . 11.8 13.4 13.5 
Manufacturing(%) 9.1 6.7 6.7 
TERTIARY SECTOR(%) 61.0 66.6 69.4 
TOTAL(%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Employed ('000) 364 446 549 
Unemployed ('000) 11 23 23 
Labour Force ('000) 375 469 572 
Unemployed(%) 3.0 4.9 4.0 
Participation 15+(%) 59.0 58.4 61.8 
years, there were around 72,000 in-migrants, an av-
erage of24,000 annually, which means that actual net-
migration was around 4000 annually (equivalent to 
0.3% of the population or 0.7% of the labour force). 
Taira and Kyan (1988) discuss the hypothesis that 
labour usually moves from lower-income to higher in-
come areas, since in the latter areas there are better 
chances for education, jobs and good income, and there-
fore attract migration from the periphery. They con-
clude that this may not be true in the case of Okinawa, 
which is the lowest income prefecture. There are brief 
stays by students and temporary workers in Japan, 
JAPAN 
1991 
6.7 
34.1 
9.5 
23.7 
59.5 
100.0 
63,690 
1,360 
65,050 
2.1 
63.8 
who return after a few years. This 
form of labour immobility (or tempo-
rarily mobility) maybe one reason why 
Okinawa has a higher unemployment 
rate than other prefectures. 
The main reasons for this form ofim-
mobility, according to Taira and Kyan, 
include that (1) Japan and Okinawa 
are almost two distinct countries, with 
distinct national identities (2) 
Okinawans are satisfied with their 
way of life (3) transport and job-search 
for Okinawans in mainland Japan are 
very costly due to distance and insu-
larity ( 4) when such costs are reduced 
through PESO (Public Employment 
Stabilisation Office) recruitment, very 
often the jobs offered are not to the 
satisfaction of Okinawans, who con-
sider low income in Okinawa to be 
(-, 
·.j 
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better than bad jobs in Japan. 
4.4.3 High School Graduates. Related to the mi-
gration issue, there is the question of school gradu-
ates' recruitment. In Japan a very illgh proportion of 
graduates tend to find jobs after being recruited by 
companies for 'lifetime· employment. In Okinawa the 
proportion of graduates recruited in tills manner is 
much lower, due to the meagre presence of very large 
firms on the island. According to Kyan and Taira 
(1988), 40% of the recruited graduates find jobs in 
Japan, 10% in Okinawa and the remaining 50% re-
main undecided. For this reason, youth unemployment 
sometimes rises to 18%in the 15-19 age group, as com-
pared to an average of 4% in Japan. During the Ameri-
can occupation tills phenomenon of illgh youth unem-
ployment was not observed. 
Each year, large firms in Japan secure a crop of good 
graduates from the Japanese mainland. They also 
employ short term workers, willch allow firms to make 
short term adjustment to changes in demand result-
ing from cyclical or seasonal fluctuations. According 
to Tiara and Kyan many Okinawan illgh school gradu-
ates take up work of a temporary or seasonal nature 
in Japan. As stated, a large number of these gradu-
ates return to the island after 3 or 4 years, and prob-
ably only about 10% settle in Japan. 
5. PROSPECTS 
As we have shown in the preceding sections, the 
Okinawan economy has attained satisfactory rates of 
growth and has enjoyed rapid infrastructural devel-
opment since its reversion to Japan in 1972. 
A visitor to Okinawa, even one with a good knowledge 
of economics, when told that the prefectural per capita 
income has in recent years exceeded US$20,000 would 
not, as an immediate reaction, consider the prefecture 
as one with grave economic problems. After all, tills 
level of per capita income is illgher than that of all 
developing countries and of most developed countries. 
The visitor could not help but notice the good state of 
roads, ports and bridges, the impressive resort hotels, 
the many modem multi-story commercial buildings 
inN aha City, the large amount of new and expensive 
cars, and the smartly dressed people of Okinawa. 
The impression that all is well with Okinawa is rein-
forced by the fact that, when compared to populations 
of other prefectures, the Okinawans enjoy a higher 
life expectancy and have a lower death rate from can-
cer or heart disease. They also tend to allot more lei-
sure time for socialising than the Japanese in gen-
eral.15 · 
However, a deeper analysis of the economy soon re-
veals deep rooted problems willch are not very easy to 
solve. The basic weakness is that the Okinawan 
economy is at present a very much dependent one. As 
we have shown, Okinawa depends on the Japanese 
Central Government for funds, on the Japanese main-
land for most of its exports and imports of merchan-
dise, and on Japanese travellers for most of its tourist 
inflows. 
5.1 Dependency Relationship 
with the Mainland 
This dependency on the mainland is typical of many 
other rather big islands, willch, like Okinawa, are ad-
ministered as provinces or departments oflarger de-
veloped states. Many such islands are characterised 
by heavy dependence on the national treasury, giving 
rise to a relatively high per capita income when com-
pared to developing countries - a fact willch conceals 
many underlying economic problems, including the 
contraction of the manufacturing sector. Many such 
islands, like Okinawa, find themselves in a situation 
where a large proportion of the fund·s originating from 
the mainland, flow back to the mainland in the form 
of imports or expatriate profits as a result of control 
by mainland economic interests. 16 
Some island populations take tills dependency rela-
tion for granted, and accept it as an economic reality 
which cannot be overcome. Some island inhabitants, 
on the other hand, especially in islands willch in the 
past have had a spell of independent existence, ex-
illbit a desire to attain higher degrees of self-reliance, 
and a feeling of frustration develops iftillngs move in 
the opposite direction. Tills is probably the situation 
in Okinawa, where the visitor can sense that some-
thing concerning the economy hurts the self-esteem 
of many Okinawan people, proud to belong to a group 
of islands which once enjoyed a high degree of inde-
pendence and created considerable wealth though in" 
ternational trade. 
The Okinawans in general are loyal subjects of Japan 
and consider themselves as part of the Japanese na-
tion (Sakihara, 1991), and the prospect of political in-
dependence does not even enter the mind of most 
Okinawans. This paper does not enter into the merits 
and demerits of political independence, although the 
present author believes that political independence 
for Okinawa is not a possible or desirable option. How-
ever, below, a hypothetical scenario shall be created 
to explore the possibility of reducing the economic de-
pendency on mainland Japan. 
Put in a nutshell, the argument put forward here is 
that the political realities of the region do not permit 
that Okinawa becomes an independent state, and 
therefore the .island has no room for manoeuvre in so 
far as the exchange rate of its currency is concerned. 
It shall also be assumed that the Yen is overvalued as 
far as the Okinawan economy is concerned. This as-
12 The Economy of Okinawa 
sumption is based on the current strength of the Yen, 
which is adversely affecting the competitiveness of 
Japanese products in general, let alone that of 
Okinawa, which has a less efficient industrial base. 
This is leading Okinawa into a vicious circle of de-
pendency with mainland Japan. It will be argued that 
this "the umbilical cord" could be severed if Okinawa 
can find a way of creating its own "comparative ad-
vantage" niches. 
5.2 Self-Reliance and Export Led Development 
Small economies, as a general rule, can only survive 
by cnltivating a relatively large foreign sector. The 
main reasons for this are: 
• Small Domestic Market and Dependence of Export 
Markets. A small domestic market means that econo-
mies of scale and efficient production of many goods 
can only be achieved by supplementing domestic de-
mand with external demand, giving rise to a rela-
tively high dependence on exports, and therefore on 
economic conditions in the rest of the world. 
• Limited Natural Resource Endowments and High 
Import Content. Small size often implies poor natu-
ral resource endowment and low inter-industry link-
ages, which result in a relatively high import con-
tent in relation to GDP. 
• Limitations on Import Substitution Possibilities. A 
small domestic market severely limits import sub-
stitution possibilities. In many small economies 
where import substitution policies. 
For these reasons, the Okinawan economy, especially 
its manufacturing sub-sector, depends to a very large 
extent on sales and purchases to and from the rest of 
the world. 
5.3 Exports of Manufactures 
Okinawa has two major types of external demand, 
·, namely that originating in mainland Japan and that 
: ) originating in non-Japanese markets. We shall refer 
'-.,_/ 
to exports to Japan as sales to the mainland and to 
non-Japanese markets as international sales. 
Exports to the Mainland. Okinawa finds it very diffi-
culty to compete with mainland Japan in exports of 
merchandise which are produced also in mainland Ja-
pan. Japan has a large internal market, joined by a 
good transport and distribution network, and penetrat-
ing this market is therefore not an easy task, consid-
ering that Okinawa has a number of disadvantages 
associated with insularity and small size. 
Okinawa also finds it difficult to export to mainland 
Japan certain merchandise which Japan purchases 
from South East Asia and other foreign countries, 
given that Okinawa does not have the option of trans-
acting other than in Yen, which has in recent years 
tended to appreciate against most foreign currencies. 
International Exports. As stated, export competitive-
ness is of utmost importance for a small economy. If. 
as assumed, Okinawa has an overvalued currency for 
its economy, economic performance will be adversely 
affected in so far as international trade is concerned. 
The effects of an overvalued currency are well known, 
and include lack of competitiveness of domestic prod· 
ucts in (a) the international markets and (b) in the 
domestic markets, against imports. The latter is es-
pecially important when substitution possibilities be-
tween domestic and foreign products exist. 
For this reason, the pricing of products using the Yen 
rate of exchange may be working against the promo-
tion ofOkinawan international sales. This arguments 
applies to merchandise as well as to tourism. 
One may remark here that Japan has been successful 
in the export sector despite the .high exchange value 
of the Yen. Cannot Okinawa be as successful as other 
parts of Japan, and override the Yen problem? The 
difficulty in this regard relates to comparative advan· 
tage. Mainland Japan has managed to develop a com-
parative advantage in its manufacturing industry (es-
pecially cars, machinery and electronic industries) and 
conditions in Japan, including government support, 
during the time when such comparative advantage was 
being developed, were favourable. In Okinawa, as ex-
plained in section 3, there are various factors which 
work against such development, including the high 
cost of electrical power17, problems of water supply, 
inadequate internal public transport facilities, high 
transport costs due to distance and insularity of the 
prefecture" and the inability of Okinawa to protect 
itself against imports from Japan. 
For these reasons, it does not appear that the 
Okinawan manufacturing sector has promising pros-
pects, at least in the foreseeable future, under the ex-
isting conditions. 
. 5.4 Exports of Services 
As stated, the contraction of the manufacturing sec-
tor has been accompanied by an expansion of the serv-
ices sector. This sector tends to have a relatively low 
earnings per unit (see Japan Statistical Yearbook, 
Table 3-28) and low productivity (Bank of Ryukyus, 
1991, p. 77), possibly being one explanation of the rela-
tively low and declining GNP per capita when com-
pared to mainland Japan. 
The relative success of the tourist sector is also not 
without problems. As argued above there are two ba-
sic problems in this regard. Apart from the question 
of rising land prices and the environmental impact, 
there is the problem oflack of diversification. Because 
of the Yen exchange value, almost all incoming tour-
ists are from mainland Japan. Attracting international 
tourists at present appears a hopeless task, even 
() 
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though Okinawa is a beautiful island - the prices of 
board and lodging and other tourist goods and serv-
ices are simply prohibitive with regard to the interna-
tional tourist market. The excessive dependence on 
Japan has given rise to a large flows of tourist income 
flowing back to mainland Japan. 
There are contrasting view about the multiplier effect 
of tourism (see Oshiro, 1993, Higa, 1991 and Bank of 
Ryukyus (1991) but it cannot be denied that the type 
of tourism at present encouraged from Japan is ac-
commodated mostly in Japanese owned hotels, in pack-
age tours to enclave areas, and is not family oriented. 
International tourism, on the other hand tends to be 
more family based, and less enclave oriented, and it 
would probably have a higher multiplier effect. 
5.5 An Alternative Path? 
As stated, the argument just developed is based on 
the premise that 
manufactured products and to services such as tour-
ism, given that inflation is sufficiently contained (see 
Briguglio, 1989). 
In the longer run, under this regime, the government 
would have to adopt an exchange rate policy which is 
consistent with the economic realities of a small ex-
port oriented economy, which cannot attain viability 
with an overvalued currency. 
Another beneficial impact on the economy could be 
the stimulus that the economy will receive from the 
much increased pressure on the Okinawan govern-
ment to adopt economic policies promoting viability 
and self-reliance.20 
The balance between the benefits and the drawbacks 
involved in this scenario would depend on a number 
of factors, not least of which is the success of the for-
eigo exchange rate policy that would adopted in 
Okinawa's cur- <-====================== 
Okinawa, and 
the ability of 
theOkinawans 
to be flexible 
enough to 
transform 
their economy 
from one based 
on transfers 
from the Na-
ti anal Govern-
ment to one de-
pending on in-
ternational 
trade. 
Political Reali-
rency is overval-
ued and that 
f'!ost ofthe ills in 
the Okinawan 
economy are re-
lated to the pre-
fecture's inability 
to develop a di-
versified exter-
nal sector due to 
an overvalued 
currency. What is 
the alternative? 
Would an inde-
pendent Okinawa 
fare better in eco-
nomic terms? 
Okinawa has been rebuilt after the devastation -~ '"'--'-' ties. We now in-
t_ ___ M::;c·::;co::;cd::;ce=rn=-c:.o=mm=:.e=r=c:.ial=s=t:.ru=ct=ur=e=s..:ar=e..:a::..:.co:.m=m=o=n===-=----'-==----'-.......J traduce politi-
A Hypothetical Scenario. For the moment, we shall 
abstain from political considerations, without mini-
mising them in the least. For the sake of the argu-
ment we assume that Okinawa has the ability to de-
termine its own exchange rate, and it sets the value of 
its currency (which we shall call here Okinawan Yen) 
at OK¥1.0 = JP¥0.75. The immediate effect of this 
change will be a reduction in the price of exports, and 
an increase the price of imports. The impact on export 
and import demand will depend on the elasticity of 
demand for Okinawan exports, the impact on the price 
of imports, and the elasticity of demand for imports" 
(see Briguglio, 1989). 
However, given that the import content of exports is 
less than 100%, the immediate effect would be a re-
duction of export prices, which can then be rendered 
more competitive with Japanese mainland exports and 
with the international market. This conclusion can be 
applied to exports of goods such as agricultural and 
cal considera-
tions in this scenario. There are two major factors that 
have to be considered in this regard. The first relates 
to the transfer of Japanese Central Government funds, 
and the second the geo-political realities of the region. 
Since this move will effectively mean economic inde-
pendence from Japan, one would expect (a) a reduc-
tion of transfers from the Central Government, with 
adverse effects on infrastructural development and 
public sector employment (b) a short and medium term 
lowering in the per capita income of the Okinawan 
people, because, amongst other things (i) the OK¥ will 
only be worth a fraction of the previous yen (ii) im-
ports will become more expensive as a result of the 
devaluation21 (iii) the construction industry will prob-
ably experience a slow down in its growth and an even-
tual contraction of its share of GNP, due to the fact 
that transfers from Japan for infrastructura! devel-
opment will decrease and (iv) the unemployment rate · 
will go up due to a reduced rate of employment in the 
() 
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construction industry. 
The biggest obstacle working against the realisation 
of this hypothetical scenario relates, however, to geo-
political realities of the region. First of all the 
Okinawan people seem, in general, disposed to remain 
part from the Japanese nation. 22 Secondly, the loca-
tion of Okinawa is not conducive towards the realisa-
tion of this scenario. This argument shall not be pur-
sued further, since it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
5.6 A Way-Out? 
Is there a third way in-between the two positions of 
high dependency on Japan and economic 
independence? One solution, and probably the most 
desirable in the existing political configuration, would 
be that, while remaining a prefecture of Japan, 
Okinawa attempts to attain international 
competitiveness, in spite of its overvalued currency, 
its small size and its international transport 
constraints. 
One way of doing this is through a vigorous attempt 
to create "comparative advantage" niches. This 
proposal, also made by Oshiro (1993) and Kakazu 
(1992)23 necessitates that Okinawa does not accept its 
existing lack of comparative advantage in many goods 
and services as a fait accompli, but should actively 
seek to modifY its economic structure to create new 
exportable products. 
"Comparative advantage" niches that can be explored 
are manufactured products, customised for particular 
markets, where intemational price is a secondary 
factor. Okinawa has a great tradition in textile and 
lacquer-ware production and these products could be 
marketed more aggressively internationally. There is 
also potential in the agricultural sector, where 
diversification of production is already under way. 
The existing international transport connection of 
Okinawa would have to be improved if such a policy is 
to be successful. It can be argued, however, that 
demand for "export niche" or customised manufactured 
products cannot be large enough to solve Okinawa's 
dependency problems. 
Okinawa could also attempt to promote comparative 
"advantage niches" in the services sector. Oshiro (1993) 
singles out intellectual, research and technology 
related activities, which are human-resource intensive 
and have a high domestic value-added. This path is 
not without difficulty, given that the island faces the 
Unportant constraint that not many intellectuals can 
Write and speak English - at present the most 
important international language in intellectual and 
related activities- at a satisfactory level. International 
communication requires an international language, 
and English serves this purpose very well. If Oshiro's 
proposals are to have any success, the teaching of 
English in Okinawa should be given much more 
importance than it is being given at present. 
The success of restructuring the economy to find 
"comparative advantage niches" will depend of course 
on the Okinawan people themselves. It will test their 
ingenuity, resourcefulness and inventiveness, because 
being able to compete internationally with an 
overvalued currency, producing relatively small 
production runs, and with international transport 
constraints is defirutely not an easy objective to attain. 
However the chances of success could be greatly 
improved if the process is accompanied by human 
resource development, encouragement of research and 
development, tax and subsidy incentives and 
improvements in the transport a.Rd commurucation 
networks. These improvements have already been 
singled out by the Okinawa Government (see Okinawa 
- GuUiebook of Industrial Location) but they have to 
be directed as far as possible, towards the creation of 
new "comparative advantage" ruches, compatible with 
the realities of the Okinawan economy just described. 
The provision of new factory sites is also important, 
but this by itself does not guarantee industrial 
development, and if the wrong strategy is adopted, 
they may eventually end up as industrial cemeteries. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have seen that the Okinawan economy 
is characterised by heavy dependence on Central 
Government funds, domination by intere·sts 
originating in mainland Japan in many spheres, and 
revenues associated with the presence of the U.S. 
military in the prefecture. These factors, especially 
the first, have been instrumental in bringing about 
economic expansion in the prefecture and a relatively 
high level of per capita income, at least when compared 
to the developing world. The economy is however very 
unbalanced, with a small and shrinking 
manufacturing sector, a large extemal trade gap, and 
relatively high unemployment rates. 
This situation has fostered a feeling among the 
Okinawan people that their economy cannot be self-
reliant and that this may be possibly due to 
incompetence on their part. However, Okinawa once 
enjoyed a high degree of self-reliance, based on 
international trade, as a result of which the Okinawan 
people enjoyed a high degree of prestige in East Asia. 
One senses a deep sense of nostalgia among the 
Okinawan people in this regard, but at the same time 
an atmosphere ofhopelessness would seem to pervade 
Okinawan society. 
Many Okinawans beliefthat it is not possible to escape 
the viscous circle of dependency: dominance by non-
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Okinawan interests and lack oflocal entrepreneurial 
spirit bringing brings about further dependency. It is 
ironic, in tbis regard, that the Okinawan politicians 
who manage to negotiate large financial transfers from 
the Kational Government may be promoting economic 
growth but at the same time may be strengthening 
the \iscous circle of dependency. 
The paper has explored briefly three possible main 
roads that the Okinawans can take. 
The first is the maintenance of the status quo, with 
continued financial support from the Japanese Central 
Government and continued domination of the economy 
by mainland Japanese interests. The full-integration 
of the Okinawan economy in the Japanese one 
enhances dependency, mostly because, it has been 
argued, the exchange rate of the Japanese Yen is 
oven·alued for Okinawa, gi\ing rise to a contraction 
of the manufacturing sector and further dependence 
on Japan. This setup has in the past guaranteed a 
good standard of!i\ing and rapid social and economic 
infrastructural development, and it is likely to 
continue doing so, as long as Central Government 
funds keep flowing in. It has however turned the 
Okinawan people into a nation of dependants on non-
Okinawan funds, hurting their pride, and subduing 
Okinawan entrepreneursbip. 
The second option is that the Okinawan people take a 
sink-or-swim path by reducing their dependency on 
mainland Japan, enabling them to opt for a more 
realistic exchange ·rate of their currency. Tbis would 
essentially render Okinawan goods and ser\ices more 
competitive in the international and local markets. 
Tbis disengagement from the Japanese economy would 
probably usher in a reduction in the standard ofli\ing 
of the Okinawans in the short and medium run, and 
there cannot be a 100% guarantee that this would be 
remedied in the long run. More importantly, it was 
argued, the existing political realities do not permit 
the realisation of tbis option. 
The tbird option briefly discussed in tbis paper is a 
\igorous attempt to create "comparative advantage" 
niches. This path, if successful, will permit the 
Okinawans to have the best of both worlds, in that 
while accepting the existing political realities, they 
will aim at improving the competitiveness of the 
prefecture vis-a-vis other prefectures and the rest of 
the World. It was emphasised however that tbis tbird 
road is fraught with difficulties, the most important 
of which is the exchange rate of the Okinawan 
currency, the small size of the economy and 
international transport connections constraints. 
However the tbird is probably the best option and it is 
hoped that through tbis path, the Okinawans will be 
able to fend more for .themselves, by generating more 
of the income they need through trade. If tbis path is 
successful, it will have the added benefit of fostering 
a sense of achievement among the Okinawan people, 
restoring their lost pride and self-confidence. 
NOTES 
1. In this presentation, the terms Okinawa and Mainland Japan 
are repeatedly used. Okinawa here generally refers to the 
Prefecture and not to Okinawa main island only. The tenn 
Japanese mainland as used here refers to the four Japanese large 
islands. 
2. Including only those islands with a land area of over 0.01 square 
,------. kilometres. (~_) 3. The Ryukyu Islands (roughly covering what is now the Okinawan 
Prefecture plus the Amami islands to the North) had a very 
interesting history (see Kerr, 1958). They became a unified 
IGngdom during the first half of the 14th Century, and enjoyed 
a quasi nation status, with tributary relations with China and 
Japan. The Kingdom was abolished in 1872. During the Ryukyu 
Kingdom era, the islands managed to develop extensive trading 
relations with many South East Asian countries including China, 
Java, Malaya, Siam and Korea. This trade expansion not only 
gave rise to considerable profit and prosperity to the Okinawa 
but also enabled the Kingdom to develop and cultivate its own 
distinctive art and culture. The Okinawans are very proud of 
this historical heritage. ACcording to a recent opinion poll in the 
Okinawa Times, the Ok.inawans wou1d seem to be worried about 
the loss of their unique culture as a result of the Japanisation 
process (Nakachi 1993). 
4. A description of the disputes regarding appropriation and renting 
of land and the rents paid by the Americans for the Military 
basis in Okinawa is given in Nakachi (1991), Rabson (1989) gives 
an account of the sufferings and humiliations of Okinawans 
under American administration, without forgetting the beneficial 
effects that such an administration had on Okinawa in the 
reconstruction proCess. For an account of the present day 
attitudes of the Okinawan people toward the American 
occupation of Okinawa see Nakachi (1993). The attitudes of the 
Okinawans towards the Japanese and the AmeriCans is discussed 
in Sakihara (1991) who suggests that the Okinawans are loyal 
subject of Japan and regard themselves as part ·of the Japanese 
nation and accept they fonn part of Japan, although their pride 
is hurt when considered as inferior country cousins by the 
Japanese. 
5. The military presence in Okinawa has had important 
repercussions on the political scene in Okinawa. Okinawan 
political attitudes can broadly be divided into two main groups 
namely (a) the Reformists (mostly represented by the Okinawa 
Social Popular Party, the Okinawa branch of the Socialist, 
Communist and Bhuddist parties and the Okinawa branches of 
the workers' unions) and (b) the Conservatives (mostly 
representing the interest of the Okinawan branch of the 
Democratic Liberal Party). The Reformists are in favour of the 
dismantlirig of the U.S. military bases as soon as possible, 
whereas the conservatives take a more cautious approach. Public 
opinion in Okinawa seemed to have been wavering between these 
political attitudes. Going by the preferences for elections for the 
Prefectural Governor, there appeared to be a majority support 
to reformist policies between 1972 to 1978 and to conservative 
policies between 1978 to 1990. The present governor, Dr. 
Masahide Ota, who has a reformist attitude, was elected in 1990. 
He has recently issued a petition to the U.S. Government for the 
early reduction and realignment of the U.S. military bases in 
Okinawa. Calls for an independent Okinawa or Ryukyu Republic 
do not enjoy much public support, although a number of 
intellectuals give serious consideration to this option (see also 
Nakachi 1993). 
6. Kakazu (1992) labels this situation "the economic boomerang 
() 
\,~/ 
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model" which is a form of dependency model where a dependent 
economy receives financial assistance which is tied to the donor 
country and returns to the donor country in the form of imports 
and other ties with the mainland. 
7. During a three month stay in Japan between March and July 
1994, the present author has calculated that on average the cost 
of food and c1othing (excluding expenditure connected with 
schooling of children) for a family of two adults and two children 
aged 10, in Japan is about four times as much as the cost for 
similar goods and a similar family size in Malta. 
. 8. See also Higa, (1993). Kakazu (1993) lists a number of other 
disadvantages which could have contributed to the lack of success 
of Okinawa. When comparing Singapore with Okinawa, Kakazu 
attributes one of the differences in performance to the style of 
macroeconoinic management. Singapore is an independent state 
whereas Okinawa is a small part of a large country. Another 
factor is that Okinawa has never had a strong leader in its long 
history. A third difference is the geo-political reality. Singapore 
is one of the busiest air and cargo ports in the world, being at 
the crossroads of the world busiest trade route. On the other 
hand Okinawa is isolated.A third factor relates to the relatively 
high unit costs in Okinawa, even when compared to Japan. 
9. According to the Annual Report of Prefectural Accounts 1993, 
published by the Economic Planning Agency of Japan (Table 1), 
Okinawa has the smallest manufacturing sector in relation to 
the Gross Prefectural Domestic Product among all prefectures. 
Two other prefecture with a relatively small manufacturing 
sectors are Hokkaido and Aomori, but in relative terms the 
manufacturing sector of these last two prefectures is twice as 
large as that of Okinawa. -
10. The share of tertiary sector associated with the public sector is 
relatively large in Okinawa when compared to other prefectures 
of Japan. According to the Annual Report ofPrefectural Accounts 
1993, published by the Economic Planning Agency of Japan 
(Table 1), Okinawa has the largest share of public sector services 
in -relation to the Gross Prefectural Domestic Product among 
all prefectures. 
11. It should be noted here that the average stay per tourist in 
Okinawa is on the low side, and declining. When comparing 
Okinawan tourism with other countries, this factor has to be 
taken into account. The number of tourist night has declined 
from around 5.4 nights per persons in the late seventies to 4.1 
nights per person in the early nineties (Okinawa Prefecture 
Tourism Statistics, 1992). 
12. According to a publicity brochure by the Okinawa Prefectural 
Government (Guidebook of Industrial Location) the transport 
contact· are mostly with Japanese airports with 33 daily domestic 
flights. The international flights are 30 per week, mostly to 
nearby Taipei, Soeul and Hongkong. 
13. The US military presence in Okinawa has given rise to a number 
of complaints from Okinawan Nationals. Apart from using useful 
land for development the basis are giving rise to forest fires 
mostly through live ammunition exercises, giving rise to various 
forms of pollution, including noise (mostly. through flying 
aircraft), air (mostly through hazardous waste upon burning) 
and sea (through live shelling and red soil flows into the sea). 
Apart from this there are other dangers associated with the 
environment, including destruction of rare species of birds, 
small animals, insects and plants). See Okinawa Prefecture, 
1993) 
14. A discussion of migration in Okinawa is given in Taira (1991J. 
Early this century, emigration was predominantly to Hawaii, 
Mexico, the Philippines, New Caledonia, Tawain and Micronesia. 
Later, between 1910 and 1940, the Philippines and Latin 
America attracted the majority of Okinawan emigrants. By 
1935, 32000 Okinawans had emigrated to Japan mainland, 
17000 to Taiwan/Micronesia, and 43000 to other countries. 
15. Comparisons of social indicators for Okinawa and other areas 
of Japan are given in Ba!lk ofRyukyus (1991). 
16. Higa (1993} gives an example of a hotel in Miyago Island, where 
it appears that around 75% of transfers flowing into the 
construction of the hotel found their way back to firms based in 
mainland Japan. Higa (1993) also argues that spending 
associated with the public sector has a large rate of leakages to 
the mainland. Also, important beneficiaries of Central 
Government transfers are non-Okinawan public sector 
employees, working in Okinawa. See also Kakazu (1991) who 
discusses the ''economic boomerang" model. 
17. Kakazu (1984i has shown that electrical power is more expensive 
in small economies. 
18. To make matters worse, the transport connection of Okinawan 
trade are mostly via mainland Japan, adding to per unit cost 
and making Okinawan exports less competitive in the 
international market. See also footnote 10. 
19. The degree of this effect depends to a large extent on import 
substitution possibilities. If imports have a very low elasticity 
of demand, ?n increase in prices may actually increase foreign 
exchange outflows (see Briguglio 1989). 
20. Another advantage, which has not been explored in this paper, 
is the possibility that economic self-reliance may stimulate 
productivity. Kakazu (1992) referring to a quotation from 
Crocombe states that in the Pacific there exists a negative 
correlation between assistance and productivity, that is, the 
more foreign assistance there is, the lower the productivity. 
Kakazu further adds that "there are cases where the more 
financial assistance there is, the Jess the willingness to save 
and the less the amount of effort". 
21. This effect depends on a number of factors. The impact of 
devaluation could be partially offset by the improved freedom 
,of choice as to purchasing of imported raw material, industrial 
supplies and consumer products, other than from the Japanese 
mainland. Another factor to consider here is that the final price 
of goods and services in Okinawa could go down as labour costs 
will be valued in OKY, and the purchasing power of the OK¥ 
could therefore increase. 
22. See footnote 4. 
23. According to Kakazu (1992), the solution to the Okinawan 
dependency problem is to disintegrate what he calls the " 
economic boomerang" situation through (1) choosing high value 
added economic activities supported by local research and 
development and (2) diversification taking into consideration 
competitive factors and not protective measures. 
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